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Abstract
Given the apparent difficulty of learning models that are robust to adversarial per-
turbations, we propose tackling the simpler problem of developing adversarially
robust features. Specifically, given a dataset and metric of interest, the goal is to
return a function (or multiple functions) that 1) is robust to adversarial perturba-
tions, and 2) has significant variation across the datapoints. We establish strong
connections between adversarially robust features and a natural spectral property
of the geometry of the dataset and metric of interest. This connection can be
leveraged to provide both robust features, and a lower bound on the robustness of
any function that has significant variance across the dataset. Finally, we provide
empirical evidence that the adversarially robust features given by this spectral
approach can be fruitfully leveraged to learn a robust (and accurate) model.
1 Introduction
While machine learning models have achieved spectacular performance in many settings, including
human-level accuracy for a variety of image recognition tasks, these models exhibit a striking
vulnerability to adversarial examples. For nearly every input datapoint—including training data—a
small perturbation can be carefully chosen to make the model misclassify this perturbed point. Often,
these perturbations are so minute that they are not discernible to the human eye.
Since the initial work of Szegedy et al. [2013] and Goodfellow et al. [2014] identified this surprising
brittleness of many models trained over high-dimensional data, there has been a growing appreciation
for the importance of understanding this vulnerability. From a conceptual standpoint, this lack of
robustness seems to be one of the most significant differences between humans’ classification abilities
(particularly for image recognition tasks), and computer models. Indeed this vulnerability is touted
as evidence that computer models are not really learning, and are simply assembling a number of
cheap and effective, but easily fooled, tricks. Fueled by a recent line of work demonstrating that
adversarial examples can actually be created in the real world (as opposed to requiring the ability
to edit the individual pixels in an input image) [Evtimov et al., 2017, Brown et al., 2017, Kurakin
et al., 2016, Athalye and Sutskever, 2017], there has been a significant effort to examine adversarial
examples from a security perspective. In certain settings where trained machine learning systems
make critically important decisions, developing models that are robust to adversarial examples might
be a requisite for deployment.
Despite the intense recent interest in both computing adversarial examples and on developing learning
algorithms that yield robust models, we seem to have more questions than answers. In general,
ensuring that models trained on high-dimensional data are robust to adversarial examples seems to be
extremely difficult: for example, Athalye et al. [2018] claims to have broken six attempted defenses
submitted to ICLR 2018 before the conference even happened. Additionally, we currently lack
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answers to many of the most basic questions concerning why adversarial examples are so difficult to
avoid. What are the tradeoffs between the amount of data available, accuracy of the trained model,
and vulnerability to adversarial examples? What properties of the geometry of a dataset determine
whether a robust and accurate model exists?
The goal of this work is to provide a new perspective on robustness to adversarial examples, by
investigating the simpler objective of finding adversarially robust features. Rather than trying to
learn a robust function that also achieves high classification accuracy, we consider the problem
of learning any function that is robust to adversarial perturbations with respect to any specified
metric. Specifically, given a dataset of d-dimensional points and a metric of interest, can we learn
features—namely functions from Rd → R—which 1) are robust to adversarial perturbations of a
bounded magnitude with respect to the specified metric, and 2) have significant variation across the
datapoints (which precludes the trivially robust constant function).
There are several motivations for considering this problem of finding robust features: First, given the
apparent difficulty of learning adversarially robust models, this is a natural first step that might help
disentangle the confounding challenges of achieving robustness and achieving good classification
performance. Second, given robust features, one can hope to get a robust model if the classifier
used on top of these features is reasonably Lipschitz. While there are no a priori guarantees that
the features contain any information about the labels, as we empirically demonstrate, these features
seem to contain sufficient information about the geometry of the dataset to yield accurate models.
In this sense, computing robust features can be viewed as a possible intermediate step in learning
robust models, which might also significantly reduce the computational expense of training robust
models directly. Finally, considering this simpler question of understanding robust features might
yield important insights into the geometry of datasets, and the specific metrics under which the
robustness is being considered (e.g. the geometry of the data under the `∞, or `2, metric.) For
example, by providing a lower bound on the robustness of any function (that has variance one across
the datapoints), we trivially obtain a lower bound on the robustness of any classification model.
1.1 Robustness to Adversarial Perturbations
Before proceeding, it will be useful to formalize the notion of robustness (or lack thereof) to
adversarial examples. The following definition provides one natural such definition, and is given in
terms of a distribution D from which examples are drawn, and a specific metric, dist(·, ·) in terms of
which the magnitude of perturbations will be measured.
Definition 1. A function f : Rd → R is said to be (ε, δ, γ) robust to adversarial perturbations for a
distribution D over Rd with respect to a distance metric dist : Rd × Rd → R if, for a point x drawn
according to D, the probability that there exists x′ such that dist(x, x′) ≤ ε and |f(x)− f(x′)| ≥ δ,
is bounded by γ. Formally,
Pr
x∼D
[∃x′ s.t. dist(x, x′) ≤ ε and |f(x)− f(x′)| ≥ δ] ≤ γ.
In the case that the function f is a binary classifier, if f is (ε, 1, γ) robust with respect to the
distributionD of examples and a distance metric d, then even if adversarial perturbations of magnitude
ε are allowed, the classification accuracy of f can suffer by at most γ.
Our approach will be easier to describe, and more intuitive, when viewed as a method for assigning
feature values to an entire dataset. Here the goal is to map each datapoint to a feature value (or set of
values), which is robust to perturbations of the points in the dataset. Given a dataset X consisting of
n points in Rd, we desire a function F that takes as input X , and outputs a vector F (X) ∈ Rn; such
a function F is robust for a dataset X if, for all X ′ obtained by perturbing points in X , F (X) and
F (X ′) are close.
Formally, let X be the set of all datasets consisting of n points in Rd, and ‖·‖ denote the `2 norm.
For notational convenience, we will use FX and F (X) interchangeably, and use FX(x) to denote
the feature value F associates with a point x ∈ X . We overload dist(·, ·) to define distance
between two ordered sets X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and X ′ = (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n) as dist(X,X
′) =
maxi∈[n] dist(xi, x′i). With these notations in place, we define a robust function as follows:
Definition 2. A function F : X → Rn is said to be (ε, δ) robust to adversarial perturbations for a
dataset X with respect to a distance metric dist(·, ·) as defined above, if, for all datasets X ′ such
that dist(X,X ′) ≤ , ‖F (X)− F (X ′)‖ ≤ δ.
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If a function F is (, δ) robust for a dataset X , it implies that feature values of 99% of the points in
X will not vary by more than 10δ√
n
if we were to perturb all points in X by at most .
As in the case of robust functions of single datapoints, to preclude the possibility of some trivial
functions we require F to satisfy certain conditions: 1) FX should have significant variance across
points, say,
∑
i(FX(xi)− Ex∼Unif(X)[FX(x)])2 = 1. 2) Changing the order of points in dataset X
should not change FX , that is, for any permutation σ : Rn → Rn, Fσ(X) = σ(FX). Given a data
distribution D, and a threshold , the goal will be to find a function F that is as robust as possible, in
expectation, for a dataset X drawn from D.
We mainly follow Definition 2 throughout the paper as the ideas behind our proposed features follow
more naturally under that definition. However, we briefly discuss how to extend these ideas to come
up with robust features of single datapoints (Definition 1) in section 2.1.
1.2 Summary of Results
In Section 2, we describe an approach to constructing features using spectral properties of an
appropriately defined graph associated with a dataset in question. We show provable bounds for
the adversarial robustness of these features. We also show a synthetic setting in which some of the
existing models such as neural networks, and nearest-neighbor classifier are known to be vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations, while our approach provably works well. In Section 3, we show a lower
bound which, in certain parameter regimes, implies that if our spectral features are not robust, then
no robust features exist. The lower bound suggests a fundamental connection between the spectral
properties of the graph obtained from the dataset, and the inherent extent to which the data supports
adversarial robustness. To explore this connection further, in Section 5, we show empirically that
spectral properties do correlate with adversarial robustness. In Section 5, we also test our adversarial
features on the downstream task of classification on adversarial images, and obtain promising results.
All the proofs have been deferred to the appendix.
1.3 Shortcomings and Future Work
Our theory and empirics indicate that there may be fundamental connections between spectral
properties of graphs associated with data and the inherent robustness to adversarial examples. A
worthwhile future direction is to further clarify this connection, as it may prove illuminating and
fruitful. Looking at the easier problem of finding adversarial features also presents the opportunity
of developing interesting sample-complexity results for security against adversarial attacks. Such
results may be much more difficult to prove for the problem of adversarially robust classification,
since generalization is not well understood (even in the non-adversarial setting) for classification
models such as neural networks.
Our current approach involves computing distances between all pair of points, and performing an
eigenvector computation on a Laplacian matrix of a graph generated using these distances. Both
of these steps are computationally expensive operations, and future work could address improving
the efficiency of our approach. In particular, it seems likely that similar spectral features can be
approximated without computing all the pairwise distances, which would result in significant speed-
up. We also note that our experiments for testing our features on downstream classification tasks on
adversarial data is based on transfer attacks, and it may be possible to degrade this performance using
stronger attacks. The main takeaway from this experiment is that our conceptually simple features
along with a linear classifier is able to give competitive results for reasonable strong attacks. Future
works can possibly explore using robustly trained models on top of these spectral features, or using a
spectral approach to distill the middle layers of neural networks.
1.4 Related Work
One of the very first methods proposed to defend against adversarial examples was adversarial
training using the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014], which involves taking
a step in the direction of the gradient of loss with respect to data, to generate adversarial examples,
and training models on these examples. Later, Madry et al. [2017] proposed a stronger projected
gradient descent (PGD) training which essentially involves taking multiple steps in the direction of
the gradient to generate adversarial examples followed by training on these examples. More recently,
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Kolter and Wong [2017], Raghunathan et al. [2018], and Sinha et al. [2017] have also made progress
towards training provably adversarially robust models. There have also been efforts towards proving
lower bounds on the adversarial accuracy of neural networks, and using these lower bounds to train
robust models [Hein and Andriushchenko, 2017, Peck et al., 2017]. Most prior work addresses the
question of how to fix the adversarial examples problem, and there is less work on identifying why
this problem occurs in the first place, or highlighting which geometric properties of datasets make
them vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Two recent works specifically address the “why” question:
Fawzi et al. [2018] give lower bounds on robustness given a specific generative model of the data,
and Schmidt et al. [2018] and Bubeck et al. [2018] describe settings in which limited computation or
data are the primary bottleneck to finding a robust classifier. In this work, by considering the simpler
task of coming up with robust features, we provide a different perspective on both the questions of
“why” adversarial perturbations are effective, and “how” to ensure robustness to such attacks.
1.5 Background: Spectral Graph Theory
Let G = (V (G), E(G)) be an undirected, possibly weighted graph, where for notational simplicity
V (G) = {1, . . . , n}. Let A = (aij) be the adjacency matrix of G, and D be the the diagonal matrix
whose ith diagonal entry is the sum of edge weights incident to vertex i. The matrix L = D − A
is called the Laplacian matrix of the graph G. The quadratic form, and hence the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors, of L carry a great deal of information about G. For example, for any v ∈ Rn, we have
vTLv =
∑
(i,j)∈E(G)
aij(vi − vj)2.
It is immediately apparent that L has at least one eigenvalue of 0: the vector v1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
satisfies vTLv = 0. Further, the second (unit) eigenvector is the solution to the minimization problem
min
v
∑
(i,j)∈E
aij(vi − vj)2 s.t.
∑
i
vi = 0;
∑
i
v2i = 1.
In other words, the second eigenvector assigns values to the vertices such that the average value is 0,
the variance of the values across the vertices is 1, and among such assignments, minimizes the sum
of the squares of the discrepancies between neighbors. For example, in the case that the graph has
two (or more) connected components, this second eigenvalue is 0, and the resulting eigenvector is
constant on each connected component.
Our original motivation for this work is the observation that, at least superficially, this characterization
of the second eigenvector sounds similar in spirit to a characterization of a robust feature: here,
neighboring vertices should have similar value, and for robust features, close points should be mapped
to similar values. The crucial question then is how to formalize this connection. Specifically, is there a
way to construct a graph such that the neighborhood structure of the graph captures the neighborhood
of datapoints with respect to the metric in question? We outline one such construction in Section 2.
We will also consider the normalized or scaled Laplacian, which is defined by
Lnorm = D
−1/2(D −A)D−1/2 = I −D−1/2AD−1/2.
The scaled Laplacian normalizes the entries of L by the total edge weights incident to each vertex, so
that highly-irregular graphs do not have peculiar behavior. For more background on spectral graph
theory, we refer the readers to Spielman [2007] and Chung [1997].
2 Robust Features
In this section, we describe a construction of robust features, and prove bounds on their robustness.
Let X = (x1, . . . , xn) be our dataset, and let ε > 0 be a threshold for attacks. We construct a robust
feature FX using the second eigenvector of the Laplacian of a graph corresponding to X , defined in
terms of the metric in question. Formally, given the dataset X , and a distance threshold parameter
T > 0 which possibly depends on ε, we define FX as follows:
DefineG(X) to be the graph whose nodes correspond to points inX , i.e., {x1, . . . , xn}, and for which
there is an edge between nodes xi and xj , if dist(xi, xj) ≤ T . Let L(X) be the (un-normalized)
Laplacian of G(X), and let λk(X) and vk(X) be its kth smallest eigenvalue and a corresponding
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unit eigenvector. In all our constructions, we assume that the first eigenvector v1(X) is set to be the
unit vector proportional to the all-ones vector. Now define FX(xi) = v2(X)i; i.e. the component
of v2(X) corresponding to xi. Note that FX defined this way satisfies the requirement of sufficient
variance across points, namely,
∑
i(FX(xi) − Ex∼Unif(X)[FX(x)])2 = 1, since
∑
i v2(X)i = 0
and ‖v2(X)‖ = 1.
We now give robustness bounds for this choice of feature FX . To do this, we will need slightly
more notation. For a fixed ε > 0, define the graph G+(X) to be the graph with the same
nodes as G(X), except that the threshold for an edge is T + 2ε instead of T . Formally, in
G+(X), there is an edge between xi and xj if dist(xi, xj) ≤ T + 2. Similarly, define G−(X)
to be the graph with same set of nodes, with the threshold for an edge being T − 2ε. Define
L+(X), λ+k (X), v
+
k (X), L
−(X), λ−k (X), v
−
k (X) analogously to the earlier definitions. In the fol-
lowing theorem, we give robustness bounds on the function F as defined above.
Theorem 1. For any pair of datasets X and X ′, such that dist(X,X ′) ≤ ε, the function F : Xn →
Rn obtained using the second eigenvector of the Laplacian satisfies
min(‖F (X)− F (X ′)‖, ‖(−F (X))− (F (X ′))‖) ≤
(
2
√
2
)√λ+2 (X)− λ−2 (X)
λ−3 (X)− λ−2 (X)
.
Theorem 1 essentially guarantees that the features, as defined above, are robust up to sign-flip, as
long as the eigengap between the second and third eigenvalues is large, and the second eigenvalue
does not change significantly if we slightly perturb the distance threshold used to determine whether
an edge exists in the graph in question. Note that flipping signs of the feature values of all points
in a dataset (including training data) does not change the classification problem for most common
classifiers. For instance, if there exists a linear classifier that fits points with features FX well, then a
linear classifier can fit points with features −FX equally well. So, up to sign flip, the function F is
(ε, δX) robust for dataset X , where δX corresponds to the bound given in Theorem 1.
To understand this bound better, we discuss a toy example. Consider a dataset X that consists of two
clusters with the property that the distance between any two points in the same cluster is at most
4, and the distance between any two points in different clusters is at least 10. Graph G(X) with
threshold T = 6, will have exactly two connected components. Note that v2(X) will perfectly
separate the two connected components with v2(X)i being 1√n if i belongs to component 1, and
−1√
n
otherwise. In this simple case, we conclude immediately that FX is perfectly robust: perturbing
points by  cannot change the connected component any point is identified with. Indeed, this agrees
with Theorem 1: λ+2 = λ
−
2 = 0 since the two clusters are at a distance > 10ε.
Next, we briefly sketch the idea behind the proof of Theorem 1. Consider the second eigenvector
v2(X
′) of the Laplacian of the graph G(X ′) where dataset X ′ is obtained by perturbing points in
X . We argue that this eigenvector can not be too far from v−2 (X). For the sake of contradiction,
consider the extreme case where v2(X ′) is orthogonal to v−2 (X). If the gap between the second and
third eigenvalue of G−(X) is large, and the difference between λ2(X ′) and λ−2 (X) is small, then by
replacing v−3 (X) with v2(X
′) as the third eigenvector of G−(X), we get a much smaller value for
λ−3 (X), which is not possible. Hence, we show that the two eigenvectors in consideration can not be
orthogonal. The proof of the theorem extends this argument to show that v2(X ′), and v−2 (X) need
to be close if we have a large eigengap for G−(X), and a small gap between λ2(X ′) and λ−2 (X).
Using a similar argument, one can show that v2(X) and v−2 (X), also need to be close. Applying the
triangle inequality, we get that v2(X) and v2(X ′) are close. Also, since we do not have any control
over λ2(X ′), we use an upper bound on it given by λ2(X+), and state our result in terms of the gap
between λ2(X+) and λ2(X−).
The approach described above also naturally yields a construction of a set of robust features by
considering the higher eigenvectors of Laplacian. We define the ith feature vector for a dataset X
as F iX = vi+1(X). As the eigenvectors of a symmetric matrix are orthogonal, this gives us a set
of k diverse feature vectors {F 1X , F 2X , . . . , F kX}. Let FX(x) = (F 1X(x), F kX(x), . . . , F kX(x))T be a
k-dimensional column vector denoting the feature values for point x ∈ X . In the following theorem,
we give robustness bounds on these feature vectors.
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Theorem 2. For any pair of datasets X and X ′, such that dist(X,X ′) ≤ ε, there exists a k × k
invertible matrix M , such that the features FX and FX′ satisfy√∑
i∈[n]
‖MFX(xi)− FX′(x′i)‖2 ≤
(
2
√
2k
)√λ+k+1(X)− λ−2 (X)
λ−k+2(X)− λ−2 (X)
Theorem 2 is a generalization of Theorem 1, and gives a bound on the robustness of feature vectors
FX up to linear transformations. Note that applying an invertible linear transformation to all the
points in a dataset (including training data) does not alter the classification problem for models
invariant under linear transformations. For instance, if there exists a binary linear classifier given
by vector w, such that sign(wTFX(x)) corresponds to the true label for point x, then the classifier
given by (M−1)Tw assigns the correct label to linearly transformed feature vector MFX(x).
2.1 Extending a Feature to New Points
In the previous section, we discussed how to get robust features for points in a dataset. In this section,
we briefly describe an extension of that approach to get robust features for points outside the dataset,
as in Definition 1.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd be the training dataset drawn from some underlying distribution D
over Rd. We use X as a reference to construct a robust function fX : Rd → R. For the sake of
convenience, we drop the subscript X from fX in the case where the dataset in question is clear.
Given a point x ∈ Rd, and a distance threshold parameter T > 0, we define f(x) as follows:
Define G(X) and G(x) to be graphs whose nodes are points in dataset X , and {x} ∪X = {x0 =
x, x1, . . . , xn} respectively, and for which there is an edge between nodes xi and xj , if dist(xi, xj) ≤
T . Let L(x) be the Laplacian of G(x), and let λk(x) and vk(x) be its kth smallest eigenvalue and
a corresponding unit eigenvector. Similarly, define L(X), λk(X) and vk(X) for G(X). In all
our constructions, we assume that the first eigenvectors v1(X) and v1(x) are set to be the unit
vector proportional to the all-ones vector. Now define f(x) = v2(x)0; i.e. the component of v2(x)
corresponding to x0 = x. Note that the eigenvector v2(x) has to be picked “consistently” to avoid
signflips in f as −v2(x) is also a valid eigenvector. To resolve this, we select the eigenvector v2(x)
to be the eigenvector (with eigenvalue λ2(x)) whose last |X| entries has the maximum inner product
with v2(X).
We now state a robustness bound for this feature f as per Definition 1. For a fixed ε > 0 define the
graph G+(x) to be the graph with the same nodes and edges of G(x), except that the threshold for
x0 = x is T + ε instead of T . Formally, in G+(x), there is an edge between xi and xj if:
(a) i = 0 or j = 0, and dist(xi, xj) ≤ T + ε; or
(b) i > 0 and j > 0, and dist(xi, xj) ≤ T .
Similarly, define G−(x) to be the same graph with T + ε replaced with T − ε. Define
L+, λ+k , v
+
k , L
−, λ−k , v
−
k analogously to the earlier definitions. In the following theorem, we give a
robustness bound on the function f as defined above.
Theorem 3. For a sufficiently large training set size n, if EX∼D
[
(λ3(X)− λ2(X))−1
]
≤ c for
some small enough constant c, then with probability 0.95 over the choice of X , the function fX :
Rd → R satisfies Prx∼D[∃x′ s.t. dist(x, x′) ≤ ε and |fX(x)− fX(x′)| ≥ δx] ≤ 0.05, for
δx =
(
6
√
2
)√λ+2 (x)− λ−2 (x)
λ−3 (x)− λ−2 (x)
.
This also implies that with probability 0.95 over the choice of X , fX is (, 20Ex∼D[δx], 0.1) robust
as per Definition 1.
This bound is very similar to bound obtained in Theorem 1, and says that the function f is robust,
as long as the eigengap between the second and third eigenvalues is sufficiently large for G(X) and
G−(x), and the second eigenvalue does not change significantly if we slightly perturb the distance
threshold used to determine whether an edge exists in the graph in question. Similarly, one can
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also obtain a set of k features, by taking the first k eigenvectors of G(X) prepended with zero, and
projecting them onto the bottom-k eigenspace of G(x).
3 A Lower Bound on Adversarial Robustness
In this section, we show that spectral properties yield a lower bound on the robustness of any function
on a dataset. We show that if there exists an (ε, δ) robust function F ′ on dataset X , then the spectral
approach (with appropriately chosen threshold), will yield an (ε′, δ′) robust function, where the
relationship between ε, δ and ε′, δ′ is governed by easily computable properties of the dataset, X .
This immediately provides a way of establishing a bound on the best possible robustness that dataset
X could permit for perturbations of magnitude ε. Furthermore it suggests that the spectral properties
of the neighborhood graphs we consider, may be inherently related to the robustness that a dataset
allows. We now formally state our lower bound:
Theorem 4. Assume that there exists some (ε, δ) robust function F ∗ for the datasetX (not necessarily
constructed via the spectral approach). For any threshold T , let GT be the graph obtained on X by
thresholding at T . Let dT be the maximum degree of GT . Then the feature F returned by the spectral
approach on the graph G2ε/3 is at least (ε/6, δ′) robust (up to sign), for
δ′ = δ
√
8(dε + 1)
λ3(Gε/3)− λ2(Gε/3) .
The bound gives reasonable guarantees when the degree is small and the spectral gap is large. To
produce meaningful bounds, the neighborhood graph must have some structure at the threshold
in question; in many practical settings, this would require an extremely large dataset, and hence
this bound is mainly of theoretical interest at this point. Still, our experimental results in Section 5
empirically validate the hypothesis that spectral properties have implications for the robustness of
any model: we show that the robustness of an adversarially trained neural network on different data
distributions correlates with the spectral properties of the distribution.
4 Synthetic Setting: Adversarial Spheres
Gilmer et al. [2018] devise a situation in which they are able to show in theory that training adversari-
ally robust models is difficult. The authors describe the “concentric spheres dataset”, which consists
of—as the name suggests—two concentric d-dimensional spheres, one of radius 1 and one of radius
R > 1. The authors then argue that any classifier that misclassifies even a small fraction of the inner
sphere will have a significant drop in adversarial robustness.
We argue that our method, in fact, yields a near-perfect classifier—one that makes almost no errors
on natural or adversarial examples—even when trained on a modest amount of data. To see this,
consider a sample of 2N training points from the dataset, N from the inner sphere and N from the
outer sphere. Observe that the distance between two uniformly chosen points on a sphere of radius
r is close to r
√
2. In particular, the median distance between two such points is exactly r
√
2, and
with high probability for large d, the distance will be within some small radius ε of r
√
2. Thus, for
distance threshold
√
2 + 2ε, after adding a new test point to the training data, we will get a graph
with large clique corresponding to the inner sphere, and isolated points on the outer sphere, with
high probability. This structure doesn’t change by perturbing the test point by , resulting in a robust
classifier. We now formalize this intuition.
Let the inner sphere be of radius one, and outer sphere be of some constant radius R > 1. Let
ε = (R− 1)/8 be the radius of possible perturbations. Then we can state the following:
Theorem 5. Pick initial distance threshold T =
√
2 + 2ε in the `2 norm, and use the first N + 1
eigenvectors as proposed in Section 2.1 to construct a (N + 1)-dimensional feature map f : Rd →
RN+1. Then with probability at least 1−N2e−Ω(d) over the random choice of training set, f maps
the entire inner sphere to the same point, and the entire outer sphere to some other point, except for a
γ-fraction of both spheres, where γ = Ne−Ω(d). In particular, f is (ε, 0, γ)-robust.
The extremely nice form of the constructed feature f in this case means that, if we use half of the
training set to get the feature map f , and the other half to train a linear classifier (or, indeed, any
7
Figure 1: Comparison of performance on ad-
versarially perturbed MNIST data .
Figure 2: Performance on adversarial data vs
our upper bound.
nontrivial model at all) trained on top of this feature, this will yield a near-perfect classifier even
against adversarial attacks. The adversarial spheres example is a case in which our method allows us
to make a robust classifier, but other common methods do not. For example, nearest-neighbors will
fail at classifying the outer sphere (since points on the outer sphere are generally closer to points on
the inner sphere than to other points on the outer sphere), and Gilmer et al. [2018] demonstrate in
practice that training adversarially robust models on the concentric spheres dataset using standard
neural network architectures is extremely difficult when the dimension d grows large.
5 Experiments
5.1 Image Classification: The MNIST Dataset
While the main focus of our work is to improve the conceptual understanding of adversarial robustness,
we also perform experiments on the MNIST dataset. We test the efficacy of our features by evaluating
them on the downstream task of classifying adversarial images. We used a subset of MNIST dataset,
which is commonly used in discussions of adversarial examples [Goodfellow et al., 2014, Szegedy
et al., 2013, Madry et al., 2017]. Our dataset has 11,000 images of hand written digits from zero
to nine, of which 10,000 images are used for training, and rest for test. We compare three different
models, the specifics of which are given below:
Robust neural network (pgd-nn): We consider a fully connected neural network with one hidden
layer having 200 units, with ReLU non-linearity, and cross-entropy loss. We use PyTorch imple-
mentation of Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2014] for optimization with a step size of 0.001. To obtain a
robust neural network, we generate adversarial examples using projected gradient descent for each
mini-batch, and train our model on these examples. For projected gradient descent, we use a step size
of 0.1 for 40 iterations.
Spectral features obtained using scaled Laplacian, and linear classifier (unweighted-laplacian-
linear): We use the `2 norm as a distance metric, and distance threshold T = 9 to construct a
graph on all 11,000 data points. Since the distances between training points are highly irregular,
our constructed graph is also highly irregular; thus, we use the scaled Laplacian to construct our
features. Our features are obtained from the 20 eigenvectors corresponding to λ2 to λ21. Thus each
image is mapped to a feature vector in R20. On top of these features, we use a linear classifier with
cross-entropy loss for classification. We train the linear classifier using 10,000 images, and test it on
1,000 images obtained by adversarially perturbing test images.
Spectral features obtained using scaled Laplacian with weighted edges, and linear classifier
(weighted-laplacian-linear): This is similar to the previous model, with the only difference being
the way in which the graph is constructed. Instead of using a fixed threshold, we have weighted
edges between all pairs of images, with the weight on the edge between image i and j being
exp
(
−0.1‖xi − xj‖22
)
. As before, we use 20 eigenvectors corresponding to the scaled Laplacian of
this graph, with a linear classifier for classification.
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Note that generating our features involve computing distances between all pair of images, followed by
an eigenvector computation. Therefore, finding the gradient (with respect to the image coordinates)
of classifiers built on top of these features is computationally extremely expensive. As previous works
[Papernot et al., 2016] have shown that transfer attacks can successfully fool many different models,
we use transfer attacks using adversarial images corresponding to robust neural networks (pgd-nn).
The performance of these models on adversarial data is shown in figure 1. We observe that weighted-
laplacian-linear performs better than pgd-nn on large enough perturbations. Note that it is possible
that robustly trained deep convolutional neural nets perform better than our model. It is also possible
that the performance of our models may deteriorate with stronger attacks. Still, our conceptually
simple features, with just a linear classifier on top, are able to give competitive results against
reasonably strong adversaries. It is possible that training robust neural networks on top of these
features, or using such features for the middle layers of neural nets may give significantly more robust
models. Therefore, our experiments should be considered mainly as a proof of concept, indicating
that spectral features may be a useful tool in one’s toolkit for adversarial robustness.
We also observe that features from weighted graphs perform better than their unweighted counterpart.
This is likely because the weighted graph contains more information about the distances, while most
of this information is lost via thresholding in the unweighted graph.
5.2 Connection Between Spectral Properties and Robustness
We hypothesize that the spectral properties of the graph associated with a dataset has fundamental
connections with its adversarial robustness. The lower bound shown in section 3 sheds some more
light on this connection. In Theorem 1, we show that adversarial robustness is proportional to√
(λ+2 − λ−2 )/(λ−3 − λ−2 ). To study this connection empirically, we created 45 datasets correspond-
ing to each pair of digits in MNIST. As we expect some pairs of digits to be less robust to adversarial
perturbations than others, we compare our spectral bounds for these various datasets, to their observed
adversarial accuracies.
Setup: The dataset for each pair of digits has 5000 data points, with 4000 points used as the training
set, and 1000 points used as the test set. Similarly to the previous subsection, we trained robust neural
nets on these datasets. We considered fully connected neural nets with one hidden layer having 50
units, with ReLU non-linearity, and cross-entropy loss. For each mini-batch, we generated adversarial
examples using projected gradient descent with a step size of 0.2 for 20 iterations, and trained the
neural net on these examples. Finally, to test this model, we generated adversarial perturbations of
size 1 in `2 norm to obtain the adversarial accuracy for all 45 datasets.
To get a bound for each dataset X , we generated two graphs G−(X), and G+(X) with all 5000
points (not involving adversarial data). We use the `2 norm as a distance metric. The distance
threshold T for G−(X) is set to be the smallest value such that each node has degree at least one,
and the threshold for G+(X) is two more than that of G−(X). We calculated the eigenvalues of the
scaled Laplacians of these graphs to obtain our theoretical bounds.
Observations: As shown in Figure 2, we observe some correlation between our upper bounds and
the empirical adversarial robustness of the datasets. Each dataset is represented by a point in Figure 2,
where the x-axis is proportional to our bound, and the y-axis indicates the zero-one loss of the neural
nets on adversarial examples generated from that dataset. The correlation is 0.52 after removing the
right-most outlier. While this correlation is not too strong, it suggests some connection between our
spectral bounds on the robustness and the empirical robustness of certain attack/defense heuristics.
6 Conclusion
We considered the task of learning adversarially robust features as a simplification of the more
common goal of learning adversarially robust classifiers. We showed that this task has a natural
connection to spectral graph theory, and that spectral properties of a graph associated to the underlying
data have implications for the robustness of any feature learned on the data. We believe that exploring
this simpler task of learning robust features, and further developing the connections to spectral graph
theory, are promising steps towards the end goal of building robust machine learning models.
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by NSF awards CCF-1704417 and 1813049, and an
ONR Young Investigator Award (N00014-18-1-2295).
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Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Before proving the theorems, it will be useful to prove a few helper lemmas that we use at various
places.
Lemma 1. Let G and G− be two graphs with V (G−) = V (G), E(G−) ⊆ E(G). Let L and L− be
their respective Laplacians. Then vTL−v ≤ vTLv for all vectors v.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of Laplacian:
vTLv =
∑
{i,j}∈E(G)
(vi − vj)2
=
∑
{i,j}∈E(G−)
(vi − vj)2 +
∑
{i,j}∈E(G)\E(G−)
(vi − vj)2
≥
∑
{i,j}∈E(G−)
(vi − vj)2
= vTL−v
Lemma 2. Let G and G− be two graphs with V (G−) = V (G), E(G−) ⊆ E(G). Let L and L− be
their respective Laplacians, with kth eigenvalue λk and λ−k respectively. Then λk ≥ λ−k .
Proof. From the min-max interpretation of eigenvectors, we have
λk = min
Sk
max
v∈Sk
vTLv
where Sk ranges over all k-dimensional subspaces. From lemma 1, we get
vTL−v ≤ vTLV
for all v ∈ Sk, and for all k-dimensional subspaces Sk. This gives us
max
v∈Sk
vTL−v ≤ max
v∈Sk
vTLV
for all k-dimensional subspaces Sk. Since this is true for all Sk, we get
min
Sk
max
v∈Sk
vTL−v ≤ min
Sk
max
v∈Sk
vTLV
From the min-max interpretation, we get λk ≥ λ−k
For all the proofs, unless otherwise stated, assume the first eigenvector (corresponding to the smallest
eigenvalue) to be the all-ones vector.
Theorem 1. For any pair of datasets X and X ′, such that dist(X,X ′) ≤ ε, the function F : Xn →
Rn obtained using the second eigenvector of the Laplacian satisfies
min(‖F (X)− F (X ′)‖, ‖(−F (X))− (F (X ′))‖) ≤
(
2
√
2
)√λ+2 (X)− λ−2 (X)
λ−3 (X)− λ−2 (X)
.
Proof. For cleanliness of notation, let G(X) = G, L(X) = L, λk(X) = λk, G−(X) = G−, etc.
Observe that
λ+2 ≥ λ2(X ′) = v2(X ′)TL(X ′)v2(X ′) ≥ v2(X ′)TL−v2(X ′)
The first part of the inequality follows from lemma 2, and second part follows from lemma 1. Now
write
v2(X
′) = αv−2 + βv⊥
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where v⊥ is a unit vector perpendicular to v−2 and all-ones vector, and α and β are scalars. Then
λ+2 ≥ v2(X ′)L−v2(X ′)
=
(
αv−2 + βv⊥
)T
L−
(
αv−2 + βv⊥
)
= α2v−T2 L
−v−2 + β
2vT⊥L
−vT⊥
≥ α2λ−2 + β2λ−3
using the property that the v−2 and v⊥ are orthogonal, and v
−
2 is an eigenvector of L
−. By rearranging,
and observing α2 + β2 = 1 (as v2(X ′) is a unit vector), we get
β2(λ−3 − λ−2 ) ≤ λ+2 − α2λ−2 − β2λ−2 = λ+2 − λ−2
β2 ≤ λ
+
2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
As |α| =
√
1− β2, we get
min(
∥∥v2(X ′)− v−2 ∥∥22,∥∥−v2(X ′)− v−2 ∥∥22) = min(2(1− v2(X ′)T v−2 ), 2(1 + v2(X ′)T v−2 ))
= 2(1− |α|)
= 2
(
1−
√
1− β2
)
≤ 2β2.
This gives us
min(
∥∥v2(X ′)− v−2 ∥∥2,∥∥−v2(X ′)− v−2 ∥∥2) ≤ √2|β| ≤ √2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
Notice that the above argument holds for any X ′ such that dist(X,X ′) ≤ ε; in particular, it holds
for X ′ = X . This gives us
min(
∥∥v2(X)− v−2 ∥∥2,∥∥−v2(X)− v−2 ∥∥2) ≤ √2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
.
Using triangle inequality, we get
min(‖v2(X)− v2(X ′)‖2, ‖v2(X)− (−v2(X ′))‖2) ≤ 2
√
2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
.
This finishes the proof as F (X) = v2(X) and F (X ′) = v2(X ′).
Theorem 2. For any pair of datasets X and X ′, such that dist(X,X ′) ≤ ε, there exists a k × k
invertible matrix M , such that the features FX and FX′ satisfy√∑
i∈[n]
‖MFX(xi)− FX′(x′i)‖2 ≤
(
2
√
2k
)√λ+k+1(X)− λ−2 (X)
λ−k+2(X)− λ−2 (X)
Proof. This proof generalizes the proof of theorem 1. For cleanliness of notation, let G(X) = G,
L(X) = L, λk(X) = λk, G−(X) = G−, etc.
Let v(X ′) be any unit vector in Sk(X ′) = Span(v2(X ′), . . . , vk+1(X ′)). We will prove a bound on
distance of v(X ′) from its closest unit vector in S−k = Span(v
−
2 , . . . , v
−
k+1). Write
v(X ′) =
k+1∑
i=2
αiv
−
i + βv⊥
where v⊥ is a unit vector satisfying v⊥ ⊥ v−i (x) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, and αi and β are scalars.
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By lemma 2, we get
λ+k+1 ≥ λk+1(X ′) = vk+1(X ′)TL(X ′)vk+1(X ′)
and by lemma 1 and by the definition of eigenvectors, we get
vk+1(X
′)TL(X ′)vk+1(X ′) ≥ v(X ′)TL(X ′)v(X ′) ≥ v(X ′)TL−v(X ′)
The first part of the inequality follows from lemma 2, and second part follows from lemma 1.
Combining the two inequalities, we get
λ+k+1 ≥ v(X ′)TL−v(X ′)
=
(
k+1∑
i=2
αiv
−
i + βv⊥
)T
L−
(
k+1∑
i=2
αiv
−
i + βv⊥
)
=
k+1∑
i=2
α2i v
−T
i L
−v−i + β
2vT⊥L
−vT⊥
≥
k+1∑
i=2
α2iλ
−
i + β
2λ−k+2
using the property that the v−i and v⊥ are all mutually orthogonal. Rearranging:
β2(λ−k+2 − λ−2 ) ≤ λ+k+1 −
k+1∑
i=2
α2iλ
−
i − β2λ−2
≤ λ+k+1 − λ−2
which implies
β2 ≤ λ
+
k+1 − λ−2
λ−k+2 − λ−2
For simplicity of notation, let
α = (α2, . . . , αk+1) ∈ Rk, v− =
∑k+1
i=2 αiv
−
i
‖α‖
Then∥∥v(X ′)− v−∥∥2
2
= 2
(
1− v(X ′)T v−) = 2(1− ‖α‖) = 2(1−√1− β2) ≤ 2β2 ≤ 2λ+k+1 − λ−2
λ−k+2 − λ−2
This shows that every unit vector in Sk(X ′) is within
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
of some unit vector in S−k , and,
by symmetry, vice-versa. Notice that the above argument holds for anyX ′ such that dist(X,X ′) ≤ ε;
in particular, it holds for X ′ = X . It thus follows from triangle inequality that every unit vector in
Sk(X
′) must be within 2
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
of some unit vector Sk(X).
Let F (X) = (F 1X , F
2
X , . . . , F
k
X) be an n× k matrix. Define F (X ′) similarly. Observe that√∑
i∈[n]
‖MFX(xi)− FX′(x′i)‖2 =
∥∥F (X)MT − F (X ′)∥∥
Now, to prove the theorem we need to show the existence of an invertible matrix M such that
∥∥F (X)MT − F (X ′)∥∥ ≤ 2√2k√λ+k+1 − λ−2
λ−k+2 − λ−2
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When 2
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
≥ √2, the desired bound is trivially true. To see this, set M to be a diagonal
matrix with diagonal entries ±1 such that 〈MiiF iX , F iX′〉 ≥ 0 for all i. Since F iX and F iX′ are unit
vectors, we get ∥∥F (X)MT − F (X ′)∥∥ = √∑
i∈[k]
∥∥MiiF iX − F iX′∥∥2
≤
√
2k
≤ 2
√
2k
√
λ+k+1 − λ−2
λ−k+2 − λ−2
where ‖·‖ denotes the Frobenius norm for matrices, and `2 norm for vectors.
So now assume 2
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
<
√
2. Let P be a projection map onto subspace Sk(X). As
F 1X′ , . . . , F
k
X′ form an orthonormal basis for Sk(X
′), projecting them onto Sk(X) must yield a basis
for Sk(X); if not, then we would have Pu = 0 for some unit vector u ∈ Sk(X ′), so that u would be
orthogonal (i.e. have distance
√
2) to every unit vector in Sk(X), which contradicts the assumption
that 2
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
<
√
2. Now let M ∈ Rk×k be an invertible matrix; such that MT corresponds
to the change of basis matrix satisfying PF (X ′) = F (X)MT (this must exist since PF (X ′) and
F (X) are both bases of Sk(X)).Then
∥∥F (X)MT − F (X ′)∥∥ = ‖PF (X ′)− F (X ′)‖ ≤ 2√2k√λ+k+1 − λ−2
λ−k+2 − λ−2
where last inequality follows since for each column vector of F (X ′), its projection onto Sk(X) has
`2 distance of at most 2
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
from it. This is because for each unit vector in Sk(X ′), there
is a vector in Sk(X) at a distance of at most 2
√
2
√
λ+k+1−λ−2
λ−k+2−λ−2
from it. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. For a sufficiently large training set size n, if EX∼D
[
(λ3(X)− λ2(X))−1
]
≤ c for
some small enough constant c, then with probability 0.95 over the choice of X , the function fX :
Rd → R satisfies Prx∼D[∃x′ s.t. dist(x, x′) ≤ ε and |fX(x)− fX(x′)| ≥ δx] ≤ 0.05, for
δx =
(
6
√
2
)√λ+2 (x)− λ−2 (x)
λ−3 (x)− λ−2 (x)
.
This also implies that with probability 0.95 over the choice of X , fX is (, 20Ex∼D[δx], 0.1) robust
as per Definition 1.
We give the proof of this theorem as a series of lemmas. First, similar to theorem 1, we show the
robustness of function f up to sign.
Lemma 3. Given two points x and x′, such that dist(x, x′) ≤ ε, the function f : Rd → R defined
in the main text of the paper satisfies
min(|f(x)− f(x′)|, |f(x)− (−f(x′))|) ≤
(
2
√
2
)√λ+2 (x)− λ−2 (x)
λ−3 (x)− λ−2 (x)
.
Proof. The proof follows from the same argument as Theorems 1 and 2 above. For completeness, we
include it again here.
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For cleanliness of notation, let G(x) = G, L(x) = L, λk(x) = λk, G−(x) = G−, etc. Observe that
λ+2 ≥ λ2(x′) = v2(x′)TL(x′)v2(x′) ≥ v2(x′)TL−v2(x′)
The first part of the inequality follows from lemma 2, and second part follows from lemma 1. Now
write
v2(x
′) = αv−2 + βv⊥
where v⊥ is a unit vector perpendicular to v−2 and all-ones vector, and α and β are scalars. Then
λ+2 ≥ v2(x′)L−v2(x′)
=
(
αv−2 + βv⊥
)T
L−
(
αv−2 + βv⊥
)
= α2v−T2 L
−v−2 + β
2vT⊥L
−vT⊥
≥ α2λ−2 + β2λ−3
using the property that the v−2 and v⊥ are orthogonal, and v
−
2 is an eigenvector of L
−. By rearranging,
and observing α2 + β2 = 1 (as v2(x′) is a unit vector), we get
β2(λ−3 − λ−2 ) ≤ λ+2 − α2λ−2 − β2λ−2 = λ+2 − λ−2
β2 ≤ λ
+
2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
As |α| =
√
1− β2, we get
min(
∥∥v2(x′)− v−2 ∥∥22,∥∥−v2(x′)− v−2 ∥∥22) = min(2(1− v2(x′)T v−2 ), 2(1 + v2(x′)T v−2 ))
= 2(1− |α|)
= 2
(
1−
√
1− β2
)
≤ 2β2.
This gives us
min(
∥∥v2(x′)− v−2 ∥∥2,∥∥−v2(x′)− v−2 ∥∥2) ≤ √2|β| ≤ √2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
Notice that the above argument holds for any x′ such that dist(x, x′) ≤ ε; in particular, it holds for
x′ = x. This gives us
min(
∥∥v2(x)− v−2 ∥∥2,∥∥−v2(x)− v−2 ∥∥2) ≤ √2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
.
Using triangle inequality, we get
min(‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖2, ‖v2(x)− (−v2(x′))‖2) ≤ 2
√
2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
.
Thus, we conclude
min (|f(x)− f(x′)|, |f(x)− (−f(x′))|)
≤ min (‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖, ‖v2(x)− (−v2(x′))‖)
≤ 2
√
2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
as desired.
While flipping signs for the whole dataset is fine, we don’t want the features of some of the points to
flip signs arbitrarily. As described in the main text, to resolve this, we select the eigenvector v2(x) to
be the eigenvector (with eigenvalue λ2(x)) whose last |X| entries have the maximum inner product
with v2(X). We show a bound on this inner product next. Let v∗2(x) be a |X| dimensional vector
obtained by chopping off the first entry of v2(x).
15
Lemma 4. For v∗2(x) defined as above, we have
〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 ≥
√
1− λ2(x)− λ2(X)
(
1− v2(x)20 n+1n
)
λ3(X)− λ2(X) − v2(x)
2
0
n+ 1
n
Proof. For cleanliness of notation, let G(x) = G,L(x) = L, λk(x) = λk, v∗2(x) = v
∗
2 , etc. Write
v∗2 = αv2(X) + βw + γ1/
√
n for scalars α, β, γ and vector w orthogonal to v2(X) and 1. Taking
inner product of both sides with 1, we get
〈v∗2 ,1〉 = α〈v2(X),1〉+ β〈w,1〉+ γ〈1/
√
n,1〉
As 〈v2(X),1〉 = 0, 〈w,1〉 = 0, and 〈v∗2 ,1〉 = −v2(x)0, this gives us γ = −v2(x)0/
√
n.
Now, as w is orthogonal to the bottom two eigenvectors of L(X), we get wTL(X)w ≥ λ3(X). Then
λ2 = v
T
2 Lv2 ≥ v∗T2 L(X)v∗2
≥ α2λ2(X) + β2λ3(X)
=
(
1− γ2 − v2(x)20
)
λ2(X) + β
2(λ3(X)− λ2(X))
Putting γ = −v2(x)0/
√
n. and rearranging, we get
β2 ≤ λ2 − λ2(X)
(
1− v2(x)20 n+1n
)
λ3(X)− λ2(X) (1)
Notice now that α2 + β2 + γ2 = ‖v∗2‖2 = 1− v2(x)20. Since we know γ2 + v2(x)20 = v2(x)20 n+1n ,
and we know α ≥ 0 by definition, we conclude
〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 = α =
√
1− β2 − v2(x)20
n+ 1
n
whereupon substituting the bound on β2 from Eqn. (6) gives the desired result.
Next, we give robustness bound on f when 〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 > 1√2
Lemma 5. Given two points x and x′, such that dist(x, x′) ≤ ε, if 〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 > 1√2 the
function fX : Rd → R defined in the main text of the paper satisfies
|fX(x)− fX(x′)| ≤
(
6
√
2
)√λ+2 (x)− λ−2 (x)
λ−3 (x)− λ−2 (x)
.
Proof. If 〈v2(x), v2(x′)〉 ≥ 0, then from the proof of Lemma 3, we get
|fX(x)− fX(x′)| ≤ ‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖
= min (‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖, ‖v2(x)− (−v2(x′))‖)
≤ 2
√
2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
and we are done.
Otherwise, let v be the vector v2(X) with a zero prepended to it. Note that 〈v2(x), v〉 =
〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 > 1√2 . Also, let w be a unit vector in the direction of projection of v on the subspace
spanned by v2(x) and v2(x′). And w⊥ be a vector orthogonal to w such that v = αw + βw⊥. This
gives us 〈v2(x′), w〉 = 1α 〈v2(x′), v〉 ≥ 〈v2(x′), v〉 ≥ 0 as 0 < α < 1. Similarly, 〈v2(x), w〉 > 1√2 .
For three unit vectors w, v2(x), v2(x′) lying in a two dimensional subspace such that 〈v2(x), w〉 >
1√
2
and 〈v2(x′), w〉 ≥ 0, if 〈v2(x), v2(x′)〉 < 0, we get 〈v2(x), v2(x′)〉 ≥ −1√2 . This implies
〈v2(x),−v2(x′)〉 ≤ 1√2 . From these inner product values, we get ‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖ ≤ 1.85, and
‖v2(x)− (−v2(x′))‖ ≥ 0.75.
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This gives us
‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖ ≤ 3 min(‖v2(x)− (−v2(x′))‖, ‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖) ≤ 3 · 2
√
2
√
λ+2 − λ−2
λ−3 − λ−2
,
where the second inequality now follows from the proof of Lemma 3.
As |fX(x)− fX(x′)| ≤ ‖v2(x)− v2(x′)‖, this finishes the proof.
Next, we show that under the conditions mentioned in our theorem, 〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 ≥ 1√2 , for most
x ∼ D.
Lemma 6. For a sufficiently large training set size n, if EX∼D[ 1λ3(X)−λ2(X) ] ≤ c for some small
enough constant c, then with probability 0.95 over the choice of X ,
Pr
x∼D
[
〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 ≥
1√
2
]
≥ 0.95
Proof. From lemma 4, we know
〈v∗2(x), v2(X)〉 ≥
√
1− λ2(x)− λ2(X)
(
1− v2(x)20 n+1n
)
λ3(X)− λ2(X) − v2(x)
2
0
n+ 1
n
For n large enough, n+1n ≈ 1, so we need to show
λ2(x)− λ2(X)
(
1− v2(x)20
)
λ3(X)− λ2(X) + v2(x)
2
0 ≤
1
2
with probability 0.95 over the choice of X , and 0.95 over x.
By Markov’s inequality, we get
PrX∼D[λ3(X)− λ2(X) ≤ 1
100c
] ≤ 0.01.
For any size n unit vector, if we pick one of its coordinates uniformly at random, it’s expected squared
value is 1n . By this argument, we get
E
X∼D,x∼D
[v2(x)
2
0] =
1
n+ 1
.
By Markov’s inequality, we get that
PrX∼D,x∼D[v2(x)20 ≥
1000
n+ 1
] ≤ 0.001.
This implies that with probability 0.98 over the choice of X ,
Prx∼D[v2(x)20 ≥
1000
n+ 1
] ≤ 0.05.
Also, note that λ2(x) ≤ λ2(X) + 1, since the second eigenvalue of a graph can go up by at most
one by adding a new vertex. We also have λ2(X) ≤ n since the eigenvalues of an un-normalized
Laplacian are bounded by the number of vertices. Putting all this together, and applying union bound,
we get that with probability 0.97 over X , and 0.95 over x,
λ2(x)− λ2(X)
(
1− v2(x)20
)
λ3(X)− λ2(X) + v2(x)
2
0 ≤
1 + n( 1000n+1 )
1
100c
+
1000
n
which is less than 12 for small enough constant c, and n large enough.
Combining Lemmas 5 and 6, we get that under the conditions stated in the theorem, with probability
at least 0.95 over the choice of X
Pr
x∼D
[∃x′ s.t. dist(x, x′) ≤ ε and |fX(x)− fX(x′)| ≥ δx] ≤ 0.05
for δx =
(
6
√
2
)√λ+2 (x)− λ−2 (x)
λ−3 (x)− λ−2 (x)
.
which finishes the proof. By applying Markov inequality and a union bound, we also get that fX as
defined above is (, 20Ex∼D[δx], 0.1) robust with probability 0.95 over the choice of X .
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Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Assume that there exists some (ε, δ) robust function F ∗ for the datasetX (not necessarily
constructed via the spectral approach). For any threshold T , let GT be the graph obtained on X by
thresholding at T . Let dT be the maximum degree of GT . Then the feature F returned by the spectral
approach on the graph G2ε/3 is at least (ε/6, δ′) robust (up to sign), for
δ′ = δ
√
8(dε + 1)
λ3(Gε/3)− λ2(Gε/3) .
Proof. Consider the graph G2ε/3 obtained by setting the threshold T = 2ε/3 on the dataset X . Let
Gε be the graph obtained by setting the threshold T = ε on the dataset X , and let Gε/3 be the graph
obtained by setting the threshold T = ε/3 on the dataset X . Note that if all datapoints in X are
perturbed by at most ε/6 to get X ′, then the inter point distances after perturbation are within ε/3 of
the original inter point distances. Hence by Theorem 1,
min(‖F (X)− F (X ′)‖, ‖(−F (X))− (F (X ′))‖) ≤ 2
√
2
√
λ2(Gε)− λ2(Gε/3)
λ3(Gε/3)− λ2(Gε/3) .
As λ2(Gε)−λ2(Gε/3) ≤ λ2(Gε), we will upper bound λ2(Gε) to bound δ′. Let v be the vector such
that the ith entry vi is F ∗X(xi), the feature assigned by F
∗ to the datapoint xi. Note that λ2(Gε) ≤∑
(i,j)∈Gε(vi − vj)2, by using v as a candidate eigenvector. We claim that λ2(Gε) ≤ (dε + 1)δ2. To
show this, we partition all edges in Gε into t matchings {Mk, k ∈ [t]}. Note that for any matching
Mk ,
∑
(i,j)∈Mk(vi − vj)2 ≤ δ2. This follows by constructing the adversarial dataset X ′ where each
datapoint has been replaced by its matched vertex (if any) in the matching Mk, and by the fact that
F ∗ is (ε, δ) robust. By Vizing’s Theorem, the number of matchings t required is at most dε + 1.
Therefore λ2(Gε) ≤ (dε + 1)δ2 and the theorem follows.
Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Pick initial distance threshold T =
√
2 + 2ε in the `2 norm, and use the first N + 1
eigenvectors as proposed in Section 2.1 to construct a (N + 1)-dimensional feature map f : Rd →
RN+1. Then with probability at least 1−N2e−Ω(d) over the random choice of training set, f maps
the entire inner sphere to the same point, and the entire outer sphere to some other point, except for a
γ-fraction of both spheres, where γ = Ne−Ω(d). In particular, f is (ε, 0, γ)-robust.
We will explain the construction of the features f in detail at the end of the proof, as they become
relevant. We give the proof of this theorem as a series of lemmas.
We use Sd−1 denote the unit sphere in Rd centered on the origin, and rSd−1 denotes the sphere of
radius r centered on the origin. ‖·‖ denotes the `2 norm.
Lemma 7. LetA be any point on r1Sd−1 andB be a point chosen uniformly at random from r2Sd−1.
Then the median distance ‖A−B‖ is M =
√
r21 + r
2
2 . Further, for any fixed ε > 0, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣‖x− y‖2 − (r21 + r22)∣∣∣ > ε] ≤ exp(−Ω(d)) + exp(−Ω( ε2dr1r2
))
.
Proof. For notational simplicity let A = r1x and B = r2y for x, y ∈ Sd−1. Assume WLOG that
x = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Suppose y is drawn by drawing z ∼ N(0, Id) and computing y = z/‖z‖. Then
‖A−B‖2 = ‖r1x− r2y‖2 = r21 + r22 − 2r1r2y1.
This immediately gives that the median value of ‖A−B‖ is M =
√
r21 + r
2
2 . Further,∣∣∣‖x− y‖2 −M2∣∣∣ = 2r1r2|y1| = 2r1r2 |z1|‖z‖
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Let z = (z1, z2, . . . , zd), and consider z′ = (z2, . . . , zd) ∈ Rd−1. Then ‖z′‖2, by definition, is a
chi-square distributed random variable with (d − 1) degrees of freedom that is independent of z1.
The following Chernoff bounds for chi-square variables applies:
Pr
[
‖z′‖2 < d− 1
2
]
≤
(e
4
)(d−1)/4
= e−Ω(d)
Pr
[
‖z′‖2 > 2(d− 1)
]
≤
(e
4
)(d−1)/4
= e−Ω(d)
Thus, for any fixed ε, r1, r2, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣‖x− y‖2 −M2∣∣∣ > ε] = Pr[2r1r2 |z1|‖z‖ > ε
]
≤ Pr
[
|z1| > ε‖z
′‖
2r1r2
]
≤ Pr
[
‖z′‖2 < d− 1
2
]
+ Pr
[
|z1| > ε‖z
′‖
2r1r2
∣∣∣ ‖z′‖2 ≥ d− 1
2
]
≤ e−Ω(d) + Pr
[
z21 >
ε2(d− 1)
8r1r2
]
≤ e−Ω(d) + exp
(
−Ω
(
ε2d
r1r2
))
using independence of z1 and z′, and Gaussian tail bounds on z1.
Now let x1, . . . , x2N be a training set, where x1, . . . , xN are sampled i.i.d. uniform from Sd−1 and
xN+1, . . . , x2N are sampled i.i.d. uniform from RSd−1.
Lemma 8. With probability at least 1−O(N2)e−Ω(d), both of these things hold:
1. For every pair (xi, xj) of points on the inner sphere, we have ‖xi − xj‖ ≤
√
2 + ε
2. For every pair (xi, xj) of points at least one of which is on the outer sphere, we have
‖xi − xj‖ >
√
2 + 3ε
Proof. By Lemma 7, for any constant R > 1 and ε = (R− 1)/8, the probability that any given pair
of points xi, xj for i < j ≤ 2N satisfies our condition is 1− e−Ω(d) (since
√
2 + 3ε <
√
1 +R2− ε
for ε = (R− 1)/8). Thus, the probability that all pairs satisfy our condition is 1−O(N2)e−Ω(d) as
desired.
Thus with probability 1 − O(N2)e−Ω(d), the graph that we construct at distance threshold T =√
2 + 2ε (with only the training points and no test point) has a very particular structure: one large
connected component consisting of all the points on the inner sphere, and N isolated points, one for
each point on the outer sphere.
Lemma 9. Let x be a randomly drawn test point on the inner sphere. Then with probability at
least 1 − O(N)e−Ω(d) over the choice of x, there is no x′ such that ‖x− x′‖ ≤ ε, and either (1)
‖xi − x′‖ >
√
2 + 2ε for some i ≤ N , or (2) ‖xi − x′‖ ≤
√
2 + 2ε for some i > N .
Proof. Certainly no such i exists if ‖xi − x‖ ≤
√
2 + ε for all i ≤ N and ‖xi − x‖ >
√
2 + 3ε
for all i > N . Using union bound and lemma 7, we get that a randomly drawn x satisfies this with
probability at least 1−O(N)e−Ω(d).
Lemma 10. Let x be a randomly drawn test point on the outer sphere. Then with probability at least
1−O(N)e−Ω(d) over the choice of x, there is no x′ such that ‖x− x′‖ ≤ ε and ‖xi − x′‖ ≤
√
2+2ε
for any i ≤ 2N .
Proof. Similar to the previous lemma, no such i exists if ‖xi − x‖ >
√
2 + 3ε for all i ≤ 2N . Using
union bound and lemma 7, we get that a randomly drawn x satisfies this with probability at least
1−O(N)e−Ω(d).
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Lemmas 9 and 10 together give us the result that for almost all points, even after adversarial
perturbation, the graph G(x) we construct with threshold T =
√
2 + 2ε is identical for all points x
on the inner sphere, and identical for all points x on the outer sphere (except a γ = O(N)e−Ω(d)
fraction): points on the inner sphere get connected to points on the inner sphere, and points on
the outer sphere get connected to nothing. Since the map from graphs G(x) to features f(x) is
deterministic, this means that f , in fact, maps all inner sphere points to one point and all outer sphere
points to another point (except a γ-fraction); that is, f is (ε, 0, Ne−Ω(d))-robust.
It only remains to show that f maps inner-sphere and outer-sphere points to different outputs. Before
proceeding further, we now fully explain the construction of the features f . Given a training set
of N points from the inner sphere and N points from the outer sphere, construct the graph G(X)
and take the bottom-(N + 1) eigenvectors v1, v2, . . . , vN+1 and prepend a 0 to each of them to
yield v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
N+1 ∈ R2N+1. To compute the feature f(x), we first construct the graph G(x).
Then, we project the vectors v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
N+1 into the bottom-(N + 1) eigenspace of G(x) to yield
vectors u1, u2, . . . , uN+1. The feature assigned to G(x) is f(x) := (u1,0, u2,0, . . . , uN+1,0) =
eT0 U ∈ RN+1, where U is the matrix whose columns are the ui, and e0 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R2N+1 .
Similarly, define the matrix V ′ corresponding to vectors v′i. Let P be the projection matrix onto the
bottom-(N + 1) eigenspace of G(x)
Assume WLOG that the first N training examples are on the inner sphere, and the other N are on the
outer sphere. Then the vector
v∗ := (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, 0, 0, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, 0) ∈ R2N+1
is in the span of the v′i, since it consists of a 0 prepended to a vector in the zero-eigenspace of G(X).
Suppose v∗ =
∑
i αiv
′
i = V
′α.
Notice that eT0 PV
′α = eT0 Pv
∗ will be 0 when x is on the outer sphere, since v∗ is itself already
in the zero-eigenspace of G(x) in this case. When x is on the inner sphere, projecting v∗ onto
G(x) will make its first component positive, since v∗ has positive dot product with the vector
u∗ = (1, 1, 1, . . . , 0, 0, . . . ) (which is an eigenvector of G(x)), and is orthogonal to every zero
eigenvector of G(x) orthogonal to u∗—and thus eT0 PV
′α > 0 for x on the inner sphere. Thus,
eT0 U = e
T
0 PV
′ must take different values on the outer and inner spheres. This concludes the proof
of Theorem 5.
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